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PEOPLE V. GROVES

[Crim. No. 13371.

In Bank.

[71 C.2d

Oct. 3, 1969.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FREDDY
GROVES, Defendant and Appellant.
[1] Arrest-Under Warrant-Complaint.-On appeal from a conviction of second degree burglary, defendant could not successfully challenge the validity of the warrant on which he was
arrested, although it was based on a complaint made on information and belief and none of the underlying facts were
set forth in the c.omplaint or .otherwise presented to the magistrate, where defendant made no challenge to the validity of
the warrant at any time during trial.
[2] Searches and Seizures-Without Warrant-Incident to Arrest
-Search of Premises.-In a burglary prosecution, the evidence
supported the trial court's implied finding that defendant's
arrest was not used as a pretext to search his apartment for
evidence, where, though police officers e.ould have arrested
defendant when he drove into his garage at the apartment
building, the arresting officer testified that the arrest was delayed, not because he wished to arrest defendant inside his
apartment, hut because he hoped defendant would lead them
to his accomplice.
[3] Id. - Without Warrant - Incident to Arrest. - The Chimel
rule relating to the permissible extent of a search incident to an
arrest does not apply to searches conducted prior to the effective
date of that case.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. Carl H. Allen, Judge.
Affirmed.
Prosecution for burglary. Judgment of conviction of second
degree burglary affirmed.
Frederick C. Michaud, under appointment by the Supreme
Court, and Bruce P. Griswold for Defendant and Appellant.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Robert R. Granucci
and Joyce F. Nedde, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of the second de[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Rev., Arrest, § 20; Am.Jur.2d, Arrest, § 14.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Arrest, § 2,; [2] Searches and Seizures, § 29; [3] Searches and Seizures, § 24.
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~~)

gree burglary of a telephone booth (Pen. Code, § 459). He
contends that his arrest and the search incident thereto were
unlawful and that the trial court therefore erred in admitting
into evidence certain items seized during the search.
'
Late in the afternoon of December 9, 1966, Mrs. Koonce and
Mrs. Peters, employees at the University of California Hospital in San Francisco, heard an alarm indicating that someone was tampering with a coin'receptacle in a telephone booth
opposite their office. They saw a' man sitting inside the oooth
and another man standing outside it with an overcoat over his
arm. Mrs. Koonce asked the men if they had taken money
from the telephone, and one of them said "No." As the me~
turned and walked quickly away, Mrs. Koonce heard a sound
like jingling money coming from the overcoat. After the men
.left the building, she saw them running down the street. The
'Coin receptacle was missing from tb;e booth.
On separate occasions a San Francisco investigator for the
telephone company showed three photographs ~ Mrs. Koonce
and Mrs. Peters. Neither was present when the investigator
showed the photographs to the other. A special agent of the
telephone company in Los Angeles had furnished the photographs to the San Francisco investigator. Both Mrs. Koonce
and Mrs. Peters identified the photograph of defendant as
that of the. man they sawin the telephone. booth. That same
day, they again identified defendant from a photograph at the
San Francisco Police Department's headquarters. A police
lieutenant who witnessed this identification signed a complaint 'Charging defendant on information and belief with
.burglary of the telephone booth. A warrant for defendant 's
arrest was issued on the complaint. No evidence was presented
to the issuing magistrate other than the signed complaint, and
it did not set forth any of the underlying facts upon which
the complaining officer's belief was based.
The, San Francisco Police Department teletyped the Los
Angeles Police Department that the arrest warrant had
issued. The teletype gave defendant's name and his physical
description; it also described an accomplice and stated that
the San Francisco police wanted defendant and an accomplice
for the crime of telephone burglary and that ·the Los Angeles
police should be on the lookout for lock-picks. A Los Angeles
police officer who had defendant under surveillance and knew
his Los Angeles address arrested defendant at an apartment
where he was living in I . . os Angeles soon after the teletype
came to the officer's attention. A 20-minute search of'the
apartment incident to the arrest uncovered coin wrappers; a
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key to the uppBr housing of a pay telephone, a $100 bill, an airline baggage tag, and a San Francisco garage ticket. All of
these items were admitted into evidence ,at defendant's
trial.
{l] Defendant 'Contends that the warrant for his ,arrest
was constitutionally invalid under People v. Sesslin (1968) 68
Ca1.2d 418 [67 Cal.Rptr. 409, 439 P.2d 321], which was decided 31ter his trial. He urges that the arrest and search
incident thereto were therefore unlawful and that the trial
court erred in admitting into evidence the items found during
the search. Although defendant objected to the admission of
this evidence on the ground that the search was unlawful f<?r
other reasons, at no time during the trial did he challenge the
validity of the arrest warrant. Accordingly, he may not challenge the validity of that warrant for the first time on appeal
unless our decision in the Sesslin case "represented such a
substantial change in the former rule as to excuse an objection
anticipating that decision." (People v. DeSantiago (1969)
ante, pp. 18, 22 [76 Cal.Rptr. 809, 453 P.2d 353], and cases
there cited.) The Sesslin decision did not represent such a
change.
In that case we held that "an arrest warrant issued solely
upon the complainant's 'information and belief' cannot stand
if the complaint or an ac'companying affidavit does not allege
underlying facts upon which the magistrate can independently find ,probable cause to arrest the accused." (People v.
Sesslin, supra, 68 Ca1.2d 418, 421.) That holding, however,
was compelled by the Fourth ~nd Fourteenth Amendments of -the United States Constitution as interpreted by five decisions
of the United States Supreme Court (Giordenello v, United
States (1958) 357 U.S. 480 [2 L.Ed.2d 1503, 78 S.Ct. 1245] ;
Ker v. California (1963) 374 U.S. 23 [10 L.Ed.2d,726, 83
S.Ct. 1623] ; Aguilar v. Texas (1964) 378 U.S. 108 [12 L.Ed.2d'
723,84 8.Ct. 1509] ; Barnes v. Texas (1965) 380 U:S. 253 [13
L.Ed.2d 818, 85 S.Ct. 942] ; Jaben v. United States (1965)
381 U.S. 214 [14 L.Ed.2d 345,85 S.Ct. 1365]). The last two of
these cases were decided in 1965, over a year before defendant's arrest and trial. Accordingly,' the Sesslin decision did
not change the law. It was merely the first case in whi'Ch this
court was called upon to apply the foregoing decisions of the
United States Supreme Court.!
We note, however, that trial-counsel's failure to object to
!Sinee the Sesslin decision did not change the law, there is no merit
in the Attorney General '8 contention that it should not apply to arrests
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the validity of the arrest warrant does not suggest any incompetency on his part. Although the issue of probable cause
to make an arrest without a warrant was not litigated in the
trial court, evidence in the record indicates that had the prosecution been called upon to do so, it might easily have justifiedan arrest without a warrant. (See People v.Chimel
(1968) 68 Ca1.2d 436, 441-442 [67 Cal.Rptr. 421, 439 P.2d
333]" revd. on other grounds, Ghimel v. California (1969)
395 U.S. 752 [23 L.Ed.2d 685, 89 S.Ct. 2034].) Aceord~ngly,
trial ~unsel mIght reasonably have concluded that anychallenge to the validity of the arrest would have been futile.
[2] Defendant contends that even if the arrest was lawful, the search incident thereto was unreasonable on the
ground that the arrest was used as a pretext to search for
evidence. (See United States v. Lefkowitz (1932) 285 U.S.
452, 467 [76 L.Ed. 877, 883, 52 S.Ct. 420, '82 A.L.R. 775] ;
People v. Ha'ven (1963) 59 Cal.2d 713 [31 Cal.Rptr. 47, 381
P .2d 927].) He. relies on the fact that the officers could have
arrested him when he drove into the garage at. his apartment
building ~ut waited until he reached his apartment. The ar..
resting officer testifi.ed, h~we-ver, that the arrest was delayed,
not because he wished' to arrest defendant inside his apartment, but because he hoped that defendant would lead them
W his accomplice. The evidence supports the trial court's implied finding that the arrest was not used as a pretext to
search for evidence.
[3] Defendant also contends that the search was more ex~
tensive than iSpBrmissible as incident to an arrest under
Chimel v. California, supra, 89 S.Ct. 2034. The Chimel case,
however, does not apply to searches conducted before that case
was decided. (People v. Edwards (19~69) ante, p. - - [8.0
Cal.Rptr. 633, 458 P .2d 713].)
The judgmentis~affirmed .
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk,. J., Burke, J.,
and Sullivan, J., concurred.
Ap'pellant 'spetition for a rehearing was denied October 29,
1969.
made before the Sesslin case was decided. Moreover, the arrest in this
case occurred after the foregoing decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, and it is therefore unnecessary to determine whether any of those
decisions should be given prospective effect only. We note also that
People v. Gardner (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 19, 23 [71 C'al.Rptr. 568], is
not in point. The arres,t in that case was without a warrant, and the
reference therein to Sesslin was only to Sesslin '8 application of the ~oc·
trine of the fruit of the poisonous tree.
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